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To say that the past five years have seen a flurry of interest in the emergence of drones 
and autonomous weapons would be quite an understatement. The works under consideration 
here – Michael J. Boyle's edited volume Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone Warfare and 
Marcus Schulzke's The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation, both 
published in 2017– represent exemplars of what could be termed a second generation in drone 
studies, moving away from the categoric adoptions (Strawser 2010) or rejections (Chamayou 
2013) of armed drones. Boyle and his contributors as well as Schulzke believe that the 
significant ethical and legal questions lie in the use of drones, and not in the weapons systems 
themselves. Boyle (pp. 2-4) and Schulzke (p. 13) agree that drones do not pose radically novel 
ethical challenges but exacerbate concerns present in warfare more broadly: the crucial 
questions, therefore, concern either how they are used ethically or unethically (for Schulzke (p. 
43)) or how they transform practices of war and understandings of ethics and law (for Boyle 
(p. 8)). 
 The question of the novelty of drone warfare and the relationship of drones to 
other weapons systems looms large in both books. While Schulzke seeks to downplay the 
significance of the emergence of remote-piloted weapons platforms, Boyle's volume seeks to 
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parse out what is transformed by drones and what is not. In so doing, Boyle's collection draws 
a much closer link between technological innovation and changes in practices of warfare, 
providing multiple compelling avenues for the continuation of the drone debate. Schulzke, 
meanwhile, emphasizing continuity with existing practices of warfare, seeks to reorient the 
debates surrounding the use of drones, highlighting how drones can improve on existing 
practices of warfare and provide a qualitative improvement in the reduction of the harms of 
war. 
 This essay proceeds in four stages. After providing brief separate summaries of 
the arguments of Boyle and Schulzke's books, I situate them in the debate between the ethics 
of weapons and the ethics of practices of war. Schulzke is firm in his conviction that the debate 
over the morality of drones themselves is moot, as weapons can be employed in a variety of 
ethical and unethical ways, while Boyle adopts a more nuanced position, tracing how drones 
can exacerbate tendencies towards more or less ethical use. I then conclude by probing the 
relation of the ethics of drones to wider strategic and political considerations, and how drones 
can push the boundaries of ethics in transformative ways. 
Boyle's book, in addition to his own introductory chapter, comprises five other chapters 
on the relationship between drones and the evolution of norms and laws of warfare. The authors 
in this volume pay particular attention to the tensions between legal regimes brought about by 
drones accelerating already present trends and bringing norms to a clash (p. 3), although these 
'new legal and ethical dilemmas [posed by] drones do not fundamentally undermine the 
applicability of traditional legal and ethical standards of armed conflict.' (p. 2) In fact, Boyle 
argues, the novelty lies not so much in the drones themselves, but in the legal interpretation 
underpinning the targeted killings program as an extension of anticipatory self-defence (p. 8). 
The other chapters discuss the interaction between the development of technology and 
the evolution of legal norms, emphasizing, as Boyle does, continuity rather than upheaval. In 
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'Getting Drones Wrong', Stephanie Carvin questions the novelty of drones and argues that 
debates over drones represent a further iteration of debates first spurred by artillery targeting 
beyond visual range, concerning the rules governing warfare at a distance. Debates over drones, 
therefore, further the tension between military necessity – allowing states 'to actually wage war 
in an effective manner' (p. 26-27) – and humanity – doing so with the minimum level of 
destruction and death necessary. With drones, Carvin argues, 'the weapon itself is seldom the 
issue at hand' (p. 23): the challenge lies rather in their effects on the overall conduct of warfare. 
Craig Martin as well as Daniel Brunstetter and Arturo Jimenez Bacardi address the 
tensions between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL). Martin's chapter discusses the 'means-methods paradox' according to which the very 
faculties of drones which might seemingly allow it to seem more compliant with IHL may in 
fact lead to more systemic violations of IHL (p. 39). He notably examines how the decision-
making process of drone operators may, in fact, lead to practices enabling systemic violations 
of principles of discrimination (pp. 54-59). In other words, violations in the 'methods' of 
warfare – the actual use of drones – may be attributable to the 'means' of warfare – the drone 
infrastructure itself (pp. 55; 62-63). Brunstetter and Jimenez address the legal and ethical 
debate between the United States and the human rights community concerning the applicable 
standards for drone strikes, claiming that, under pressure, the United States transitioned from 
a strategic-legal frame to a legal-normative discourse (p. 74). Brunstetter and Jimenez further 
argue that the tension between the conditional protections afforded by IHL (championed by the 
United States) and the right to life accorded under IHRL (supported by the human rights 
community) also brings into view a debate over the meaning of human rights and the range of 
harms – insecurity, psychological harms – which are not considered under IHL (p. 88). 
The two final chapters by David Whetham and by Caroline Kennedy and James Rogers, 
consider the use of drones to enforce protections in peacekeeping missions. While Whetham 
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argues that the surveillance role of drones allows them to deter violations of human rights (p. 
100), Kennedy and Rogers make a much more compelling case for the use of armed drones to 
multiply peacekeeping capabilities (p. 117). However, while they convincingly argue that 
drones can reduce requirements for ground troops in peacekeeping missions, they discuss very 
cursorily how armed drones could actually prevent mass atrocities, a point to which I return 
below. 
 
While Boyle and his contributors cautiously explore continuity and novelty in the legal 
and ethical frameworks surrounding the use of drones in warfare, Schulzke takes a quite more 
radical approach, rejecting any notion of drone exceptionalism and arguing for perfect 
continuity in the ethical assessment of warfare. Except for a few rare types of weapons which 
could under no circumstances be used morally – mainly weapons of mass destruction – 
Schulzke argues that weapons in themselves are morally neutral, and that the only assessment 
of the ethics of weapons lies in their use. Establishing the concept of the latent potential of 
weapons systems, Schulzke states that the range of potential uses of drones enables them to be 
employed in a variety of roles, both ethical and unethical. Somewhat more controversially, 
while affirming that drones do not require any form of fundamental reassessment of just war 
theory, Schulzke maintains that drones possess the potential to wage war more morally than 
human beings. 
Schulzke's discussion, therefore, is highly decontextualized and abstract, with minimal 
references to actual uses of drones. While Boyle and his contributors consider the interplay 
between drone technologies and practices – and therefore maintain the possibility of 
considering drones as leading to systemic violations of IHL based on their empirical use – 
Schulzke asserts that to demonstrate that drones are morally defensible weapons, he merely 
needs to show that they have the potential to be used in compliance with just war theory; 
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however, he goes further in arguing that drones present moral advantages which make them 
better than comparable weapons (p. 117, 222). Proceeding through the principles of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, this book therefore argues that drones, used within well-established 
limits, can raise ethical thresholds for the use of violence, strengthen rules of engagement, and 
ultimately lead to fewer deaths. In comparison to other means of warfare, Schulzke argues, 
drones can be more discriminatory, more proportionate, and overall less destructive, thereby 
establishing their moral worth. 
Throughout, Schulzke argues largely by refutation, drawing on a large number of 
critiques of drones to establish the value of his approach separating the weapon from practices 
of war, which would be problematic for all forms of warfare, not merely drone warfare. In so 
doing, however, he narrows the scope of his study: despite two chapters on the jus ad bellum 
(one on the ethical challenges of drones, and one on the potential regulation of drone use to 
strengthen ethical compliance), Schulzke's vision is one where the availability of weapons 
systems bears no influence on the decision to use military force. He therefore rejects outright 
any argument to the effect that drones may encourage the use of military force, or that their 
secrecy may lead to more extensive uses of force. To the extent that these may constitute valid 
concerns, they can be remedied by a strengthening of ethical norms against aggression, by an 
emphasis on the need for a just cause, and by norms on domestic and international transparency, 
and therefore do not pose a particular challenge to drones themselves. 
Neither of the books under consideration argues that drones are, in themselves, 
inherently and irredeemably immoral. As mentioned above, for Schulzke, drones are 
'defensible weapons platforms', which can be deemed ethical only in their use or misuse (p. 
12). Furthermore, because any weapon (except for WMDs) can be used for either ethical or 
unethical conduct, any evidence of negligence causing excessive collateral damage, or even of 
deliberate war crimes through drones cannot be used as evidence of their problematic morality. 
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Drones do, however, change moral calculation by enabling further ethical conduct. By 
removing combatants by the battlefield and thus removing the justification for self-defence, by 
lowering the costs of restraint – i.e. by reducing the risk that spared enemies might attack 
friendly forces – and by allowing the positive identification of targets through loitering and 
advanced visual capabilities, Schulzke states that drones present the ability to strengthen rules 
of engagement and tolerate little to no risk of collateral damage (p. 117).  
In so arguing, however, Schulzke finds himself in a double bind. First, as Martin notes, 
these capabilities can hardly be described as moral 'advantages' (p. 173) outside of their use in 
practice. Thus, Martin argues, the 'paradox' may well be that these seeming benefits of drones 
will simultaneously lead to more pervasive legal violations (p. 39). Furthermore, as Megan 
Braun and Brunstetter note, a high proportion of targeted killing strikes lead to civilian deaths, 
more so than with other weapons systems (Braun and Brunstetter, cited by Brunstetter and 
Jimenez, p. 83). Short of considering the practices in which these drones are used, therefore, 
Schulzke's moral advantages remain little more than hypothetical. Furthermore, as Derek 
Gregory has demonstrated – and Martin mentions (p. 54) – visual acuity does not equal 
understanding of a situation and distance does not equal detachment, leading potentially to 
violations of principles of just war (Gregory 2018; see also Williams 2015).  
Secondly, Schulzke establishes these moral advantages of drones by distinguishing the 
developments that can be attributed to the weapons platform and those which can be attributed 
to wider trends in warfare. As such, he argues, a reduction in casualties would be attributable 
to weapons (drones) presenting a greater potential for discrimination and for both ad bellum 
and in bello proportionality. To borrow Carvin's words, drones in Schulzke's account may 
present the perfect solution to the dilemma of balancing military necessity and humanity. It 
might be worth wondering, however, whether the use of drones indeed constitutes an 
overcoming of the tension between force protection and the protection of civilians (pp. 122-
 7 
125), or rather its enactment: a military which decides to intervene with drones has made a 
choice to privilege troop protection over the presence of ground troops. Such a decision has 
ethical and strategic implications, and would precede Schulzke's evaluation of the ethical 
compliance of drones. Furthermore, while Schulzke is correct in arguing that drone operators 
are not at personal risk while piloting their drones, Schulzke is silent on the potential use of 
drones to overwatch and protect allied forces or civilians (see p. 125-128) which, as Gregory 
shows, can fundamentally skew judgment (Gregory 2018). 
Drones, for Schulzke, are not responsible for the wider character of war: 'Drones are 
not the cause of the US military's controversial style of targeted killing or its geographically 
unrestrained counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations. Rather, they are one symptom of 
the American strategy of waging the War on Terror by any means available.' (p. 57) The point 
is well taken that drones do not, in themselves, create the necessity for their use. It is equally 
correct that drones are part of an array of tactics – special forces raids, conventional aerial 
bombing, cruise missile strikes – and that a rejection of drone strikes would not mean an end 
to targeted killing (p. 58). However, in separating these two elements, Schulzke brackets off a 
crucial question, namely whether the availability of drones creates pressures for their use. 
Boyle, in comparison, openly inquires whether the ubiquity of drones may lead to the 
normalization of targeted killing, and whether the proliferation of technology may lead to a 
proliferation of norms enabling drone use (p. 16). Carvin, as well as Brunstetter and Jimenez, 
note how technological innovations can create pressures leading to changes in laws of war and 
human rights (Carvin, p. 26; Brunstetter and Jimenez, p. 88). Schulzke seeks to present drones 
as morally advantageous weapons by dismissing cursorily any suggestion that drones may 
impact the wider character of war and the norms governing it. Would the United States have 
pursued a strategy of targeted killing without drones? Would they have opted, as Schulzke 
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suggests, for a more destructive strategy (p. 177)? At any rate, such questions deserve careful 
consideration, not summary dismissal. 
Schulzke, therefore, falls prey to what Elke Schwarz criticises as the biopoliticization 
of ethics of violence, that is, the transformation of ethics from a judgment to a code that can be 
applied blindly, in a calculating fashion, leading to 'narrowed horizons for ethical debate' 
(Schwarz 2018: 172). Ethics, therefore, in Schwarz's account, is transformed by violent 
technologies from an inquiry into whether it is right to kill into a technological endeavour to 
kill more effectively (Schwarz 2018: 191; 198). It is particularly jarring that Schulzke asserts 
the heightened ability of drones for proportionality (both ad bellum and in bello) while 
excluding the question of whether drones can achieve a given objective (p. 189).  Carvin argues 
that 'good inquiry about drones will focus on overall strategy', including 'second- and third-
order effects' (p. 33). Indeed, what Carvin highlights here is that it is impossible to discuss the 
proportionality of military actions effectively without a consideration of their role vis-à-vis 
strategic objectives (and whether any tactical action furthers this strategic objective). In other 
words, if targeted killings can be shown to be effective in increasing security and defeating the 
given enemy, then considerations of how to pursue this strategy better become relevant, and 
Schulzke's discussion becomes highly pertinent. If, however, targeted killings do not, in fact, 
further the pursuit of strategic objectives, then discussions of whether drones allow for more 
discriminatory killing become moot, as the requisite level of proportionality (both in bello and 
ad bellum) may never be established.  
Boyle's contributors are generally much more careful in charting the co-development 
of technical means, legal and ethical norms, and practices. The two chapters on the use of 
drones in humanitarian intervention suggest novel ways in which drones' capabilities can be 
used in furtherance of strategic objectives, both through deterrence and through coercion. At 
times, however, once again, the discussion remains quite idealized. Kennedy and Rogers agree 
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with Schulzke that drones are not inherently immoral and that, if used to protect of civilians 
and human rights within a humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping framework, armed 
drones can be 'in an opportune position to intervene' (p. 117). Whether such intervention – 
which Kennedy and Rogers suggest would mostly consist in stopping threatening rebel forces 
(p. 119)  – would be feasible and effective in the absence of a ground presence remains a crucial 
question that needs to be further examined in order to ascertain the potential of drones for 
ethical armed action. 
Thus, while fellow travellers on part of the journey, agreeing on the necessity to avoid 
ascribing moral value to a weapons platform itself, Schulzke and Boyle nevertheless end up in 
somewhat opposed camps. While Schulzke, arguing for the moral potential of drones, 
advocates for the deontological regulation of drones, Boyle's contributors, following Carvin, 
tend to approach the ethical and legal governance of drones through a rather teleological 
perspective. It is impossible, for Boyle and his contributors, to separate the narrow ethical 
assessment of a drone strike from the wider context of their use in warfare. Nevertheless, both 
works should be commended for suggesting new frameworks for the ethics of warfare. Above 
all, Schulzke's concept of the latent potential of weapons systems opens new horizons for the 
study and regulation of weaponry which may, additionally, allow for the bridging of the gap 
between non autonomous, semi-autonomous, and fully autonomous weapons systems (as 
Schulzke briefly considers in Chapter 6). The six chapters in Boyle's volume, meanwhile, must 
be commended for providing a plurality of perspectives on related legal and ethical questions, 
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